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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPRE3E COURT OF TIIE UNITED STATES. 1
2
ENGLISH COURTS OF COMMON LAW.
COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY.3
4
SUPREM.qE COURT OF MISSOURI.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY.5

SUPREME COURT COMMISSION OF OHIO. 6
ACTION.

See Street.

ADMIIRALTY.
Collision-Rldps crossmg-Sip o'ertaking.-A ship and a barque
were both on the port tack. The barque was the windward vessel, and
had the wind three points free. The ship was close hauled, and when
first sighted by the barque was approaching her on her lee beam : fleld,
affirming the decision of the judge of the Admiralty Court, that the
ships were crossing each other, and that it was the duty of the barque,
being the windward vessel, to get out of the way of the other. The
definitiob of an "overtaking ship" in Ilie Franconia (2 P. D. 8) questioned: The .Peckfortoa Castle, Law Rep. 2 P. D. (Ct. App.).

APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS.
.Direction by Debtor.--Where a person owes another several distinct
debts, he has the right to choose which debt he will pay first; and
where, at the time o" payment, he expressly directs what application is
to be made of the payment, the creditor, if he retains the money, is
bound to appropriate it as directed by the debtor: Stewart v. Hopk is,
80 Ohio St.
The creditor cannot divert a payment, so made by his debtor, from
the appropriation made by him, upon mere equitable considerations, that
do not amount to an agreement between the parties giving the creditor
a right to appropriate the payment otherwise than directed by the debtor,
though mere equitable considerations may control, where the payment
is made without designating its application : Id.
A-RBITRATION AND AWARD.

Agreement with Conductor that Manager of Company sLall ".e sole
Judge between Company aund Condutor)-Jurisdctionof Magistrate hozo
far affected.-The complainant became conductor of a tramway conipany, under an agreement by which he was to pay them 51., to be
. Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1877. The cases will probably be reported in 6 or 7 Otto.
2 Selected from late numbers of the Law Reports.
3 Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, by John Q. Ward, Esq.,
Cynthiana, Ky., from opinions filed during the present term. The cases will be
reported in 13 Bush.
4 From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 66 Missouri Reports.
5 From G. D. W. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 11 of his Reports.
6 From E. L. DeWitt, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 30 Ohio St. Reports.
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retained together with his wages fir the current week, as security for
the discharge of hik duties and the observance of the rules of tile cornpany, &e., the company to have power, in ease of any breach by the
conductor of the rules, to retain thc 51. and his wages for tile
current
week as liquidated dan:iges br such breach ; and it was provided that
the manager of tie company should be the sole judge between the company and the conductor, whether the company was entitled to retain the
whole or any part of the 51 and wages for the current week as liquidated damages ; and t hat the certificate should be binding and conclisive evidence in all courts of justice, civil and criminal, and before all
stipendiary and police magi.trates, &e., that the amount thereby certi.
fied as the amount to be retained was the true amount to be retained,
and should bar the conductor of all right to recover it " The coniplainant having summoned the company before a police magistrate,
under 6 & 7 Vict., cl. 86, to recover his deposit and wages : 11ehl, that
the agreement was not illegal, and tle complaint being substantially a
civil proceeding, the manager's certificate that the deposit and wages
had been forfeited. was conclusive evidence of the fact, precluding the
magistrate from making further inquiry: London Tramway Go. v.
Bailey, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. Div.
See Champerty.
13ILLS AND NOTES. See Aluinicpeil Bonds.
ATTORNEY.

CHA3IIPEITY.

A'p'rctment letireen Attorney and Client.-In Missouri champertous
contracts are void ; but a contract between attorney and client is not
chamnpertous because the attorney agrees to receive, as a compensation
for his services, a portion of the property in controversy It is an
essential element in a champertous contract, that he also agree to pay
some portion of the costs or expenses of the litigation : Duke et al. v.
Ilarper et A,.66 Mo.
Hitsband and W',; 31ftnicial Bonds.
See (C,'inulLfuw; Statute.
Due Process rif Law.-An assessment of the real estate of plaintiff
in error, in the city of New Orleans. fbr draining the swamps of that
city. was resisted in tlie state courts, and brought here by writ of error,
on the ground that the proceeding deprives the owner of his property
without due pr,,ec.-s of' law : Atrilsmn v. Bocard of Administrators of
tiew Orleans and the City qf AXwi Orleans, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
The origin and history of this provision of tile Constitution considered
as fbund in Maina Charta and in the 5th and 14th Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States : .
The difficulty and the danger of attempting an authoritative definition
of what it is for a state to deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due proces of law, within the meaning of the 14th Amendment, suggesre,, and the better mode held to be to arrive at a sound definition by the
annunciation'of the principles which govern each case as it arises : Id.
It has already been decided in this court, that due process of law
does not require that the assertion of the rights of the public against
the individual, or the imposition of burdens upon his property for the
CONFLICT op LAWS.

See

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
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public use, should in all cases be done by a resort to the courts of
justice: Id.
In the present case it is held, that when such a burden, or the fixing
of a tax or assessment, is by the statute of the state required to be submitted to a court of justice before it becomes effectual, with notice to
the owners and the right ou their part to appear and contest the assessment, this is due process of law : Id.
Post-offices and Post-roads-Reyulation of Mails-Linitation, (f
Powers to search.-The power vested in Congress to establish "postoffices and post-roads" embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of the country. Under it Congress may designate what shall be
carried in the mail, and what shall be excluded : Matter of A. Orlando
Jackson, S. C. U. S, Oct.- Term 1877.
Letters and sealed packages subject to letter postage in the mail can
only be opened and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is
required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household.
The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure. in
their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their
papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be: -7d.
Regulations against the transportation in the mail of printed matter,
which is open to examination, cannot be enforced so as to interfere in
any manner with the freedom of the press. Liberty of circulating is
essential to that freedom. When, therefore, printed matter is excluded
from the mail, its transportation in any other way cannot be 1brbidden
by Congress: Jd.
Regulations excluding matter from the mail may be enforced through
the courts, upon competent evidence of their violation obtained in other
ways than by the unlawful inspection of Jetters and sealed packages;
and with respect to objectionable printed matter, open to examination,
they may in some eases also be enforced by the direct action of the
officers of the. postal service upon their own inspection, as where the
object is exposed and shows unmistakably that it is prohibited, as in the
case of an obscene picture or print: Id.
CORPORATION.

Suit by-Liability of Assignee of Corporate Stock.-ln a suit by a
corporation, a plea of the general issue admits the competency of the
plaintiff to sue as such : Pullmanv. Upton, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
An assignee of corporate stock who has caused it to be transferred
to himself on the books of the company, and holds it as collateral security for a debt due from his assignor, is liable for unpaid balances
thereon to the company or to the creditors of the company, after it has
become bankrupt: Id.
Liability on Contract.-Although there may be a defect of power in
a corporation to make a contract, yet if a contract made by it is not in
violation of its charter, or of any statute prohibiting it, and the corporation has by its promise induced a party relying on the promise and in
execution of the contract to expend money and perform his part thereof.
the" corporation is liable on the contract: Ritchcock et al. v. Oity of
Galveston, S. 0. U. S.; Oct. Term 1877.
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CRIMINAL

LAW..

Act not rindnal at Time ,/"C,,mmis.:,,n c,,iot become so b'ySubseqiu'at Act oj" 1'arty-I",r,d .*,,risdrlit,n o'er Crims.-An act
which is not an offenei at the time it is eomitted cannot become such
by any subsequent independent act of the party, with which it has no
connection. Aceordiugly the ,tatute of the United States which dedares that every person re.-peeting whomn proceedings in bankruptcy
are commenced, either upon his own petition or that of a creditor, who
within three months betore their commencement obtains goods upon
false pretences with intent to defraud, shall be punished by imprisonment. is inoperative to render the act an offence, because its criminal
character is to be determined by subsequent proceedings, which at the
time the goods were so obtained may not have been in his contemplation, and may be instituted against his will by another : United States
v. Lewis Fox.,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
It is competent for Congress to enforce by suitable penalties all legislation necessary or proper to the execution of powers with which it is
intrusted; and any act committed with a view of evading such legistion or fraudulently securing its benefit. may be made an offence against
the United States. But it is otherwise when an act committed in a
state has no relation to the execution of a power of Congress or to any
matter within the jurisdiction of the United States. An act having no
such relation is one in respect to which the state can alone legislate:
Id.
Larceny-KF-tures.-S. was indicted for stealing four chandeliers,
of the value of $40. The chandeliers were attached to the house of N.
by being screwed into a gas-pipe that was fastened to the ceiling: Held,
that at the common law there could be no larceny of a fixture if severed
and carried away by one continuous act; but the modern authorities
apply this rule only to-things issuing out of, or growing upon, the land,
and such as adhere to the freehold; not to personal chattels that are
constructively annexed thereto. In such eases as this it is immaterial
whether the carrying away was immediate and continuous, or whether
the severance was at one time and the asportation at another. The
party was guilty of larceny if there was a felonious taking: Smith v.
Cornatou wealth, 13 Bush.
CUSTO.M.

Landlord and Tenant-C('stom of the country as to Seeds, Tihlages,
&c.-Prim-,facie the landlord is the per.on liable to the outgoing tenant,
at the expiration of his tenancy, for the seeds, tillages, .&c., properly
betowed by himn upon a farm. Although, therefore, the ordinary practice (to avoid circuity) is for the incoming tenant to pay the outgoing
tenant for the seed, tillages, &c., upon a valuation made between them,
yet an alleged custom or usage that the outgoing tenant shall look to the
incoming tenant for payment, to the exclusion of the Jandlord's liability,
cannot be supported.: Bradburn v. Pohy, Law Rep. 3 C. P. Div.
DAMAGES.

See Telegraph.

Assessable as of date of idt.-Judgments refer to the situation of the
parties at the commencement of the suit, and, as a general rule, damages
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are allowed in personal actions only to that date. In the case of continning injuries, compensation for subsequent loss must be sought in
another suit after the damage is sustained: Brewster v. Sussex Railroad
Co., 11 Vroom.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Payment of Partof Debt-Effect of-The payment by a debtor of a
part of his liquidated debt is not a satisfaction of the whole, unless made
and accepted upon some new consideration. Where, however, the debt
is unliquidated and the amount is uncertain this rule does not apply.
In such cases the question is whether the payment was in fact made and
accepted in satisfaction: Baird et al. v. The United States, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1877.
Where a party brings an action for a part only of an entire indivisible
demand and recovers judgment, he cannot subsequently maintain an
action for another part of the same demand: Id.
DEED.

See Warranty.

EASEMENT.

Light-Quantum of Enjoymet-Right not to be measured by Purpose for which Light actually used.-In an action for the obstruction
of ancient lights, the judge directed the jury that they were to consider whether there had been a sensible diminution of light, so as to
make the plaintiff's premises less available for the purposes of occupation or business, to which they were then, or might thereafter, be made
applicable, and that the damages were to be estimated according to the
diminution of value of the premises for such purposes: Held, a right
direction, on the ground that the purposes for which the premises had
actually been used while the light had been'enjoyed, weie not the proper measure of the right. Martin v. Goble, 1 Campbell 320, dissented
from Moore v. Hall, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. Div.
EVIDENCE.

.kerts-Handwriting---Standards of Comparison.-Standards of
comparison, to be used by experts upon the trial of an issue as to the
genuineness of a signature, when not a paper already in the case or
admitted to be genuine, are not admissible for that purpose, unless they
are clearly proved by witnesses who testify directly to their having been
written by the party whose signature is in question: Pavey v. Pavey,
30 Ohio St.
Where a receipt was offered as such standard of comparison, and a
witness testified that the defendant gave him a receipt that looked very
similar to the one offered, but that he could not positively say that it
was the identical one offered in evidence: Held, that the evidence was
too uncertain to warrant the admission of the paper as a standard of comparison: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Marriage Statutes -regulatingFormspresumed to be Directory only.
-Marriage is a civil contract, and at common law when made per verba
de presenti is valid as of common right: Meister v. Moore et al., S. C.
U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
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Though a state may by statute declare no marriage valid unless solemnized in a prescribed form, 3et such construction will not be given to
the law unless the legislative intention to that effect be plainly expressed:
I.1
Hence, whatever forms may be prescribed by statute they are treated
as directory only, and a marriage, good at common law, is held valid
notwidtlstamlin the digrgard of statutory forms unless the statutes contain express words of nullity : id.
(0nilh'ct of L ws-( 'ons,
it/--lariage illegal by the Law of
Domcih.-The petitioner and respondent, Portuguese subjects in Portugal. and first cousins to each other, caine to reside in England in 1858,
and in 1966 they went through a form of marriage before the registrar
of the district of the city of London. In 1873 they returned to Portugal, and their domicile throughout continued to be Portuguese. By
the law of" Portugal a marriage between first cousins is illegal, as being
incestuous, but may be celebrated under a Papal dispensation. flehl,
reversing the decision of' the court below, that the parties being by the
law of the country of their domicile under a personal disability to contract marriage, their marriage ought to be declared null and void.
Snonin v Malla,. 2 Sw. & Tr. 67; 29 L. J. (P. M. & A.) 971, distinguished : Soltomayer v. DeBarros, Law Rep. 2 Prob. Div.
INSURANCE.

Agreement for Extension of T e for Payment of Preziur -Agent.
-Where it is the practice or an insurance company to allow its agents
to extend the time for payment of premiums and of notes given for premiums, it is indicative of the power given to those agents, and it is
proper to submit evidence of such a practice to the jury : Knickerbocker
.Lie Ins. (b. v. -Yorton, S. C. U. S.. Oct. Term 1877.
If"the agreement to extend be imade before the note given for the
premium matures, and before the forfeiture is incurred, it would be a
fraud upon the insured to attempt to enforce the forfeiture when, relying
on the agreement, lie permits the original day of payment to pass : ld.
Bolicy-Lhnittion ers to Time of Bringing Suit.-The charter of an
insurance company required all suits to be brought on policies issued
by the company within twelve months from the date of loss. A policy
issued to the plaintiff contained a stipulation that'it was made and
accepted subject to the charter, and also provided that no suit or action
for the recovery of any claim by virtue of the policy should be sustained in any court, unless commenced within twelve months after the
loss should occur, and should any suit or action be commenced after the
expiration of twelve months, the lapse of time should be taken and
deened as conclusive evidence against the validity of the claim, any
statute of linitation to the contrary notwithstanding. Plaintiff brought
suit on the policy more than twelve months after a .loss had occurred:
field, that the above stipulation was operative and binding, and precluded the plaintiff from maintaining his suit : Glass v. Walker, Assignee of the State Insurance Conpany, 66 Mo.
.lla'itine-Deriationi
,age-Subsequent Injury not caused bfy
the Dcrietion.-Where the contract of insurance on a steamboat stipu-
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lutes for its continuance for one year, " unless it is terminated or made
void by conditions thereinafter expressed," and contains a "permission
to navigate the Ohio and Mississippi rivers below Cairo," but contains
no condition expressly avoiding the policy fbr navigating the boat outside of the permitted waters, and the boat made a trip outside of these
permitted waters and returned in sallety where she was afterward destroyed by fire, in no way caused or contributed to by such departure :
eblt, that the only effect of such deviation was to relieve the insurer
from any loss happening outside of the permitted waters, and that said
policy was not avoided thereby, and that after a temporary departure and
return in safety to the permitted waters, the insurers are liable for a
subsequent loss covered by the policy, not caused or contributed to by
such deviation : Wilkins v. insurunce Company, 30 Ohio St.
INTEREST.

See .MunicipalBonds.

JOINT TENANTS.

Survivorship by Contract.- The, right of survivorsbip in estates
held by joint tenants was abolished by statute in 1796. Yet joint tenants may by contract founded upon a sufficient consideration, agree that
the survivor shall take the whole estate, or in case of one or more having children that the estate after the death of the last survivor shall pass
and be vested in such children and their issue in equal shares and proportion. Under such a contract the tenants would still hold a life estate, and might require partition. And this life estate with the conditional estate, falling to any one in the event of his being the survivor,
might be the subject of sale, yet the ultimate estate would pass to the
survivor or the child or children of the survivor or survivors: Tluesdale
v. White, &c., 13 Bush.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Liability of Lessee after -Leaving Premises.-A lessee remains liable
on his express agreement to pay rent, notwithstanding he may have assigned his lease with the lessor's assent, and the lessor has accepted rent
from the assignee: Lodge v. White, 80 Ohio St.
But where the obligation of the lessee to pay rent is only that which
is implied by law from his occupation of the premises, his assignment
of the lease and surrender of possession to the assignee, with the assent
of the lessor, extinguishes the privity of estate between the lessor and
lessee, and the consequent implied liability of the lessee to pay rent: Id.
The -assent of the lessor to such assignment, where nothing to the
contrary appears, may be implied from his charging the rent to the new
tenant and accepting payment thereof from him: Id.
.Monthly Renting-Notice to Quit.-In monthly tenancies, a month's
notice to quit is sufficient: Steffens v. Earl,11 Vroom.
A notice must be to quit at the end of one of the recurring periods
of holding, but a notice to quit on the day corresponding with the date
of letting and entry is sufficient: Id.
Where no time is mentioned, and no annual rent reserved in a letting,
the character of the tenure, as to time, will be controlled by the intervals between the payments; monthly or weekly payments implying
monthly or weekly tenancies: Id.
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I,ihi'//ccl

(bon ninh.,te ,,,I,',,* in .f, t-Eiuence of Express
n an actiol 11'r ilib.. uit r tie eva.-ion is privileged, it is
for dli plaintiff to e.-tailiA IIat tlie .tateinitts COmplained of were
made from an indirct, nitive, such as tinger, or with a knowledge that
they were untrue, or widhunt earing whether they were true or false,
and wit br the rea-,nl which would otherwise render theni privileged;
and it" tlii' defendnot made the statements believing tlem to be true, he
will i,t hahehe protection arising froui the privileged occasion, although
lie had no reasonable grounds for his belief: Clark v. .lolneux, Law
Rep. 3 Q. B. Div.
LIEN.
Personad Property-Contract.- f be lieu at common law of the vendor
of laersanal property to secure the payment of purchase-money is lost by
the voluntary .id unconditional delivery of the property to the purchaser,
but this does not prevent the parties from contracting for a lien which,
as between themselves, will be good after delivery : regory v..Norris
et iL, S. C. U. s., Oct. Terin 1877.

Ji"/wdic.-

Lis PENDENS.
See Title.
Jh,s be in a Domestic Borei.-At law the pendency of a former
action between the same parties for the same cause, is pleadable in
abatement to a second action, because the latter is regarded as vexatious. But the former action must be in a domestic court, that is, in a
court tif the state in which the second action has been broug'ht : Mutual
L ;' Insurance Co. v. Harris,S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
The clea of a suit pending in equity in a lbreign jurisdiction will not
abate a suit at law in a domestic tribunal: Id.

MALICIOUS SUIT.
Abtsc of Civil Process -If a suit is instituted on a false claim, and is
brought purely for malice and vexation, and without any probable cause
thcrefor, the defendant's right of recovery for the expenses incurred in
defending such a suit, other than ordinary costs, should be as fully recognised as if his property had been attached, his body taken, or his
reputation injured. The damages may be less, but for the injury inflicted by such a suit a remedy should be afforded by the law, other than
the judgment for ordinary costs: Woods v. Fennell, 13 Bush.
MARRIAGE.
See Husband and Wife.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

IiwJuries to Servant-DTf_)irec Machinery.-It is the duty of employers to use ordinary care and diligence in providing sufficient and safe
machinry fbr their employees; and if they know, or by the exercise of
ordinary care and prudence could have known that machinery was defective and dangerous. and permit it to be used, they are responsible in damages. unless the defbct was known by the employee, or could have been
known by the exercise of ordinary care : Quaid v. Cornwall, 13 Bush.
If' the employer had actual ktuuwled_,e of the defective machinery,
then he would be liable, unless he warned the employce of his danger: Id.
VOL. XXVI.-76
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MERGER.

.Mortgagee acguirng Equity of 1cderntion.-The assignee of a mortgage, acquiring the equity of redemption, may keep alive such mortgage
as a part of his title: New Jersey/Ins. Co. v. Meeker, 11 Vroom.
MORTGAGE.

See Merger.

MUNICIrAL BON1DS.

AeAgotiable Paper-Defences-P1urhaserfrom bofl fide HolderlIterest.-Where to a municipal bond which has several years to run,
an over-due and unpaid coupon for interest is attached, that fact does
not render the bond and the subsequently maturing coupons dishonored
paper, so as to subject them, in the hands of a purchaser for value, to
defences good against the original holder: Cromwell v. Count of ,S'ac,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
A bonfl fide purchaser of negotiable paper for value before maturity
takes it freed from all infirmities in its origin ; the only exceptions
being where the paper is absolutely void fbr want of power in the maker
to issue it, or where the circulation is prohibited -by law for the illegality
of the consideration. Municipal bonds payable to bearer are negotiable
instruments and subject to the same rules as other negotiable paper : Id.
A purchaser of a municipal bond from a bona fide holder who had
obtained it for value before maturity, takes it equally freed as in the
hands of such holder, though he may have had notice of infirmities in
its origin : Id.
A purchaser of a negotiable security before maturity, unless personally chargeable with fraud in the purchase, can recover the full amount
of the security against the maker, though he may have paid less than
its par value, whatever may have been its original infirmity : ld.
When the rate of interest at the place of contract differs from the
rate at the place of payment, the parties may contract for either rate,
and the contract will govern : i.
Municipal bonds in Iowa, drawing ten per cent. interest before maturity, draw the same interest, under the law of the state, after maturity,
and coupons attached to such bonds draw six per cent. after maturity.
Judgments in that state entered upon such bonds and coupons draw interest for the amount due on the bonds at the rate of ten per cent. a
year, and upon the amount Zue upon the coupons at the rate of six per
cent. a year : Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Street.
Contract by.-Common council of H. contracted for the improvement
of a street according to fixed specifications of material and work. Under
the contractor's construction of the contract he left a part of the work
undone. The city paid him for the work done and made an assessment
on the lot-owners for the work done : Held, that the council could only
contract by ordinance and that they must prescribe the kind and amount
of improvement to be made, and the kinds of material to be used; having
done this, and having no authority to do otherwise, they had no authority to accept a part performance so as to bind the lot-owners ; having
no authority in the first place to contract at the expense of the lot-owners
for such work as the contractor or city engineer might think ought to
be done: Henderson Ciy v. Lambert, 13 Bush.
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The contractor could not have recovered against the city or lot-owners
becau e he had not lwribrmed his contract. le could not have recovered
on a i.ntum ?n, ,it ; because one cannot recover for work, done upon
a public street except upon a contract: d.
NEOGLIOENCE.

See Xalstcr and Servant; Railroad.

Railrrol-Gethiq(4! Train whie in qnotion.-Tlle plaintiff took a
scat in a railroad car, to be carried to the next station on defendant's
road, but not having the usual thre for that point, twenty-five cents,
handed the conductor a five dollar bill, out of which to take the fare.
Being unable to change the bill or to get it changed on the train, he prorised plaintiff to get it changed when they arrived at the next station,
and to return the balance, after deducting the fare, to which plaintiff
assented. On arriving there, the plaintiff being at the end of his journey. left the train, but waited on the platform while the train remained
some twenty or thirty minutes, expecting the conductor to return him
his money, but did not demand it, because he thought the conductor
was busy. but seeing the train starting and the conductor, who had tbrgotten or neglected his promise, get aboard as it moved away, he ran
some distance beyond the platform and climbed upon the car as it was
moving off with increasing speed, for the sole purpose of getting his
money. The conductor on demand for his change, handed him back
the same bill and, as plaintiff claims, told him to get .off the train as
quick as possible, and immediately he jumped from the trainvoluntarily
and without compulsion, while it was running at tha rate of four or five
miles per hour and at a place not intended for passengers to alight. It
did not appear that the remark of the conductor caused plaintiff to act
differently from what he otherwise would have done nor that he requested
that tIhe train be stopped or slacked up to enable him to get off in safety:
el, that when the plaintiff got upon the. train after it had moved
away from the station, for the exclusive purpose of getting from the
conductor the money due him and when he jumped off at a'point beyond.
nct suitable for, nor intended for passengers to alight, the relation of
pas~enger and carrier did not subsist between him and the railroad company : Pilusbwqh, Cincinnatiand St. Louis Railwa3 Co. v. Krouse, 30
Ohio St.
The failure of the conductor to return him his money before leaving
the station, did not exempt him from the exercise of proper care and
prudence in attempting to get on and off the train while in motion, and
acting under no compulsion: Id.
It was the province of the jury to determine both the nature and
effect of this remark of the onductor; whether it was intended and
understood as an order to leave the train, or was by way of advice in
furtherance of plaintiff's intention, and also whether such remark
affected the action of the plaintiff, and caused him to act differently from
what he otherwise would have done: Id.
If the conductor ordered or directed the plaintiff to get off the train
while it was in motion, at a place where it was not prudent to make the
attempt, such" order or direction, without compulsion, did not warrant
the plaintiff to do a hazardous or imprudent act, and impute the conse.LqIeces to the company. Whether the act was an imprudent one,
amounting to contributory negligence, was for the jury to determine, in
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view of all the circumstances in the case, the remark of the conductor
and its effet on the mind of the plaintiff included: i.
Not to be imuted to Chliid-R,,ihioad-Passcngerchanging 0,r -lhile
T1 'ai in motio.-The doctrine of imputed negligence does not prevail
in the state of Ohio, and a child of tender years, injured by the fault
of another, is not deprived of a right of action, by reason of contributory
negligence on the part of a parent. or guardian : Cleveland, &c., Rail.
Moad Co. v. Manson, 30 Ohio St.
For a traveller upon a railroad train to pass from one car to another
while the train is in motion, may generally be considered an act of negligence or imprudence; but when a party, acting under a suggestion
from the conductor, attempts to pass from car to car, and is injured in
consequence of the fact that the train was still moving, such party will
not be debarred his right of recovery, merely because he undertook to
comply with the conductor's suggestion, and it is the province of' the
jiry to determine both the nature and effect of the conductor's remarks ;
whether they were intended and understood as an order to change from
car to car, or were by way of advice, and also whether such remarks affected the action of the parties, and caused them to act differently from
what they otherwise would: Id.
It is the duty of a railroad company to exercise the highest degree of
care in the carriage of passengers, and it is the duty of conductors, when
women andchildren are upon their trains, not to direct them to go into
places of danger without furnishing such assistance as will' prevent accident: Id.
Corporationa-Defective Machinerj-Wilful Neglect.-In an action
against a corporation for destruction of life. by wilful neglect, held, that
evidence conducing to show that the machinery used was not of the
most modern and approved character, and that defective machinery was
in use, was not only competent, but that the jury would have been warranted in finding from such evidence alone that the killing was the
result of wilful neglect: Claxton v. Lexigton & Big Sandy Railroad,
13 Bush.
To make out a case for destruction of life by wilful neglect, it must
be shown that the conduct of the party in fault was such as to evidence
reckless indifference to the safety of the public, or an intentional failure
to ptrform a plain and manifest duty, in the performance of which the
public or the party injured had an interest: -M.
There must be such conduct as implies actual malice or anti-social
recklessness : Id.
And when this grade of negligence is established, the guilty party
must answer in damages, no matter how negligently the person injured
may have acted: Id.
RAILROAD.

Negligence -Bridge.-There is no legal obligation on the part of a
railroad company to build its bridges under public roads with an elevation so great that one of its employees standing upright on the top of a
car will not be endangered, and consequently, if an employee while thus
standing in the course of his business, be struck by one of such bridges,
he cannot recover for such injury: Baylor v. Delaware, Lackawanna
and Western Railroad Co., 11 Vroom.
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SAVINGS ]BANK.

A.ttu' o.-A savingi bank is an institution in the ,ands of disinterv.ted persons., the profits of which, after deducting the necessary
expenses of' conducting the business, inure wholly to the benefit of the
depositors. in dividends or in a reserved surplus for their greater security: untington et at. v. Iational ,Savings Bunk, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1877.
SIERIFF'S SALE.

TV1le- Warrantl.--There is no implied warranty of title by a sheriff
on a sale of property under execution. When a sheriff acts in good
faith in making a levy and selling the property of the execution debtor,
having no sufficient reason to doubt the title, he cannot be held responsible for failure of title, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies; but when
the sheriff has information of the existence of an adverse claim, or
such information as would put one of ordinary prudence on inquiry in
regard to title, then it is his duty to take a bond of indemnity, which
would protect the owner and purchaser, or his duty at least to inform
the bidders of the adverse claim, and a failure to do one or the other
would render him liable to the purchaser: Earrison v. Shanks, 13
Bush.
SHIPPING.

Dem urrage-Bill of Laing- Clrter-part.- Consignee lreented
from clearing Ship by the default qf other Consinees.-A cargo of wheat
was shipped on board the plaintiff's ship under eight bills of lading,
which contained the following clause: Three working days to discharge the whole cargo, or 301. per day demurrage." The defendants,
the endorsees of one of the bills of lading, were prevented from completely unloading their portion of the cargo within the lay days, because
it lay at the bottom of the hold, under the portions of cargo belonging
to the other consignees, and such other portions of the cargo were not
unloaded in time to enable the defendants to clear the ship of their portion within the lay days. The master was ready and willing to discharge
the defendants' portion of the cargo as soon as it could be reached, and
the defendants to receive the same, and the discharge of it in due time
was only prevented by the before-mentioned circumstances: Held, that
under the above-mentioned stipulation of the bill of lading, the consignee, as between himsdlfand the ship-owner, undertook to bear the
risk of being prevented from discharging his portion of cargo from the
ship within the lay days by the default of his fellow-consignees, and
the defendants were therefor6 liable fbr demurrage: Straker v. Kidd,
Law Rep. 3 Q. B. Div.
In a second ease the charter-party under which the ship was chartered
stipulated that fourteen working days were to be allowed for loading
and unloading at the port of discharge, and ten days on demurrage at
351. day by day. The bills of lading, one of which, for a part of the
cargo, had been endorsed to the deibndants, contained the words, "paying freight for the same goods and all other conditions as per charterparty." In other respects the facts were precisely similar to those of the
first case: Held. that the defendants were liable fbr demurrage : Porteus
et (1l. v. Watney et al.t, Law Rep. 3 Q. B. Div.
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STATUTE.

ConstitutionalLaw--Generaland Special Laws.-The constitutional
amendment that prohibits the enactment of special and local laws in
certain cases, applies to laws regulating the internal affairs of cities, as
well as those of counties. Such. matters are now required to be regulated by general laws, in all cases in which such course is practicable:
State ex rel. Van Riper v. Parsons, 11 Vroom.
Within the sense of thege prohibitory clauses, a general law as contradistinguished from one special or local, is a law that embraces a class
of subjects or places, and does not omit any subject or place naturally
belonging to such class : Id.
When a legislative end, within this department, cannot be effected by
a general law, a special dr local act may be resorted to for that purpose,
as heretofore : 17l.
In a proceeding by quo warranto, if the ground of informatiQn is
that a law, in point of fhct, will apply to but a single city, and is therefore local, such information must set forth the fihcts in a traversable form.
showing this to be the situation: Il.
General.-A law, framed in general terms,.restricted to no locality,
and operating equally upon all of a group of objects, which, having regard to the purposes of the legislation, are distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and important to make them a class by themselves, is not a special or local law, but a general law : State ex rel. TI'an
Riper v. Parsons,11 Vroom.
Local.-An act which, by its terms, is a supplement to a city charter,
and designed to regulate the internal affairs of such city, is a local act,
and is unconstitutional and void: State, Bingham, Prosecutor,v. ayor
of Camdem, 11 Vroom.
STREET.

Railroads on-Damages to PiroeM.tyower-Aetion.-A railroad
company, with the consent of the authorities of the city of L., laid down
a track in one of the streets of the city, and operated its trains thereon.
The owner of a house and lot brought suit against the railroad company
for damages sustained by the partial obstruction of the street, and the
injury sustained by the noise, dirt, smoke, cinders and jarring of the
train : Held, that be could recover, and that the criterion of damages
was .the diminution of value to his house and lot, occasioned by the location and use of the road; to be determined by finding the value of the
house and lot just before the railroad was talked of and located, and
then determine what part of thitt value was taken from the house and
lot by the obstruction of the street and the annoyance incident to the
movement of engines and trains of cars along and over the railroad:
Jeff & Mad. & Ind. Railroad Co. v. Esterle, 13 Bush.
Enhanced vendible value of property by reason of the location of the
road,,cannot be set off against the damage sustained by the location: Id.
TELEGRAPH.

Failureto deliver .Message-Damages.-In case of a breach of contract, actual damages not being proved, nominal damages may be recovered : First Nat. Bank v. Western Union Telegraph Co, 30 Ohio St.
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In cage of failure to deliver a telegraphie message. the company is only
liable for such damages as naturally flow from the breach of contract, or
such as imay fairly be sulipoed to have been within the contemplation
of the parties atthe time the contract was made : Id.
If the telegraph compa.y is in default, but their defiult is made mischievous to a plaintiff only by the operation of some other intervening
cause, such as the dishonesty of a third person, the rule "causa iroxirna non renzota .specttur"applies, and the company cannot be made
responsible for the loss occasioned by the act of such third person : Id.
TENEMENT.

Several Tenements in same Rouse-Horizontal Division of Land.There may be several and distinct tenements in the same building, under
the same roof. as well where one is over the other, as where ones is besfda
the other: M'in,,ti College v. Yeatinan, 30 Ohio St.
When, in consideration of a gross sum in advance, an estate for years,
renewable for ever, is granted in realty, it is real and not personal property, ivithin the meaning of the tax laws of Ohio : Id.
Where such au estate is granted in the second story of a building by
the owner of the fee, who is under perpetual covenant to rebuild, in
case of fire or other casualty, with the same rights to the lessee in the
new building as in the old, the interest and estate of the lessee is taxable
in his name, when, by the terms of the lease, such was the intention
of the parties: Id.
Whether there is such an estate in specified apartments of a building,
which amounts to an interest in the realty, and whether, in such a case,
the lessee should pay the taxes on such part of the whole, is to be determined by the terms of the lease : 7d.
TiTm.

Bonafide Purchaser-Lispendens.-Thetitle of a bondfide purchaser
for value without notice, will not b'e affected by the fact that his grantor
acquired title by fraud or from one mentally imbecile. Notice that there
was an existing lawsuit, and that the title would be contested, will not
deprive him of the character of a low fiide purchaser, if such lawsuit
has no relation whatever to the alleged fraud or mental imbecility, the
defects insisted upon in the present suit. The defendant had a right to
infer that the threatened litigation was to proceed upon the same ground
as the former suit: Drake v. (rowell, 11 Vroom.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
See Lien.
Maiver of Vendor's Lien:--Defendant having sold a tract of land to
one P., on the same day bought another tract of plaintiff. For the
purchase-money of the latter tract plaintiff received defendant's two
notes, together with the proceeds of defendant's sale to P., which consisted in part of cash and in pdrt of notes executed by P. Defendant
conveyed his laud to P., and received from plaintiff a title bond for the
land bought of him. -Ayear afterward, defendant, at the instance and
by the advide of plaintiff, by the payment of 6l00, obtained from P. a
mortgage on the land he had sold P. securing the payment of P.'s notes.
Defendant's notes were paid, P. failed to pay his, and plaintiff foreclosed
the mortgage, realizing a part of the debt only. In a suit to subject the
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land sold by plaintiff to defendant to the payment of the unpaid balance :
Rehl,that by advising and accepting the mortgage from P. plaintiff had
waived any vendor's lien he might have had upon this land : Amderson
V. Gri#ith, 66 Mo.
VERDICT.

Not impeachable by Testimony of Juror.-The affidavit of a juror
cannot be used to impeach the verdict of a jury of which he was a
member, by showing that the verdict was the result of an agreement
that such a verdict should be rendered as was favored by a majority of
the jury: Lucas et al. v. Cannon et al., 13 Bush.
WARRANTY.,

Subsequently-acquired Title-Deed-It is a: well-settled proposition,
that subsequently-acquired lands pass under a grant with warranty:
Broadwell v. Phillips, 30 Ohio St.
If parties have taken possession of land and occupied for a series of
years under a deed containing an erroneous description: the mistake, as
against the grantor and his representatives, will be corrected, where the
evidence clearly shows such mistake: -N.
WILL.
Unlue .lnfluence.-The probate of a will was contested on two
grounds : want of capacity and undue influence : HeRld that the declarations of the deceased were competent to go to the jury on both isues:
Lucas v. Cannon, 13 Bush.
In the lower court, undue influence was defined to be, "such influence as is.exercised by coercion, imposition or fraud, not such as merely
arises from the influence of gratitude, affection or esteem ; it must be
the ascendancy of another will over that of the testator by reason of
coercion, imposition or fraud :" Held to have been erroneous. The jury
ought to have been instructed to find against the-will, if they believed
from the evidence that the testator's wife or others had acquired such
complete dominion over the testator's mind as to destroy free agency ;
if this dominion was exercised to induce him to make a will which, if
not under such influence, he would not have made. And this might
have been the case, although there was neither imposition, threats, fraud
nor coercion: Id.
WITNESS.

Party-Competent at Common Law to prove Contents of a Lost
Trunk -At common law a party to a suit is a competent witness to
prove the contents of a trunk or package, which by other testimony is
shown to have been lost or destroyed under circumstances that render
some one liable for the loss, and section 1079, Rev. Stat., was intended
to do no more than to restore in the Court of Claims the common-law
rule excluding parties as witnesses, which had been abolished by the
Act of July 1st 1864; and, hence, claimant in this case was competent
to prove the contents of a package of government money taken from his
official safe by robbers: United States v. Clark, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1877.

